This paper re-examines post-cold war predictions of German hegemony in Central Europe. Focusing on the four ‘Visegrad’ states, it examines each of the three pillars of prospective German hegemony. It concludes that only in the economic pillar can Germany be perceived as dominant. German dominance in the political realm is limited by historical factors and by the supranational structures of the EU. German cultural influence or ‘soft power’ is undermined by domestic economic and political problems, as well as the availability of alternative models. Thus, while Germany is clearly a powerful country, it is difficult to argue that it exercises even a limited ‘soft hegemony’ in Central Europe today.

INTRODUCTION

The end of the cold war and German unification created the possibility for a new political order in Central Europe. In the opinion of many observers, this new order would be characterized by the re-establishment of German dominance, albeit within the supranational structures of an enlarged European Union (EU). This new German ‘hegemony’ would rest on three pillars: economic, political, and cultural. While Germany’s Central European neighbours (the newly independent post-communist states) might be wary of German power and influence, it was generally believed that they would accept this hegemony because of the need for German economic assistance, the attractiveness of Germany’s economic and democratic achievements, and the absence of any realistic alternatives.

Nearly 15 years after the date of German unification, how accurate have these predictions been? Have the expectations of German hegemony been realized, and if not, why not? Admittedly, 15 years is a relatively brief period of time from an historical perspective, and it may be premature to draw any firm conclusions one way or the other about this question. However, it should be possible to identify key trends, and to arrive at some preliminary conclusions that may tell us something about the course of future developments.

This essay re-examines the German hegemony thesis in light of the political and economic developments of the past 15 years. The next section discusses the German hegemony thesis in more detail. In the following sections each of the three pillars of prospective German hegemony – economic, political, and cultural – are examined in turn, with the goal of determining the extent of German influence and dominance in each of these areas. For practical reasons, and because these are Germany’s
closest and most important neighbours in Central Europe, this study focuses on the four ‘Visegrad’ countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. In the final section, some preliminary conclusions about the hegemony thesis and Germany’s future role in Central Europe are discussed. It is argued that Germany is not hegemonic in Central Europe, and that moreover the extent of its political and economic influence in the region may be overestimated. A key reason for the absence of German hegemony is the EU’s supranational structures and processes, which lessen the dependence of the Central European countries on Germany, and moderate and condition German power more than they add to it.

THE GERMAN HEGEMONY THESIS

The German hegemony thesis was advanced, in one form or another, by many academic experts and political observers in the wake of 1989 and German unification. Many agreed with Wallace that a united Germany was Europe’s ‘natural hegemon’. Germany’s economic power and central geographical location, it was argued, together with the ‘good fit’ of its multi-level institutions and post-national identity and interests with the realities of an integrating Europe would make it the continent’s dominant power, especially now that access to its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe had been regained. In the post-cold war ‘new Europe’, a powerful and united Germany would once again be at the centre of things, both literally and figuratively, while other traditional European powers – i.e. France and the UK – would be relegated to the periphery. A key to this new German hegemony was the supranational economic and political structures of the EU. While these would serve to alleviate concerns about German power and independence, they would also be increasingly dominated and shaped by Germany. The plan for European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), agreed to at the December 1991 Maastricht conference, was emblematic of this emerging German hegemony, the product of German economic, political, and cultural power exercised indirectly through European institutions.

Not everyone agreed with the prediction of German hegemony. Some argued that Germany was not economically powerful enough to be hegemonic in Europe. Others pointed to internal political and economic factors that would limit Germany’s potential to exert external leadership, or to external institutional and geopolitical constraints on Germany’s capacity to assert its national power and interests. Still others argued that Germany’s political culture had been profoundly transformed as a consequence of historical catastrophe and post-war experience. The lessons of the past had been learned and the national will to power had been lost, replaced by the ideology of multilateralism and post-nationalism. A major factor impeding German hegemony, therefore, would be the deeply ingrained aversion to leadership and self-assertion of the Germans themselves.

However, while not everyone was prepared to concede the case for German hegemony in Europe, there were far wider expectations of German hegemony in the Central Europe sub-region. Germany was traditionally the dominant power in this part of Europe, but its influence had been severely reduced by its defeat in the Second World War, its post-war truncation and division, and the descent of the iron
curtain. German unification in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Empire had now re-established the conditions for German dominance in Central Europe.

The thesis of German hegemony in Central Europe was based on a number of factors, including geography (Germany’s physical proximity to the post-communist states of Central Europe, sharing borders with Poland and the Czech Republic); relative size (united Germany had a population of 80 million, nearly twice as many as the next largest Central European country, Poland, with 40 million, while the other Central European countries are much smaller); and historical tradition (Germany’s traditional influence and role in this region). It was also founded, however, on three pillars of expected German dominance: economic, political, and cultural.

The economic pillar is perhaps the most obvious and easily understood. Germany was Europe’s dominant economic and monetary power, and the third largest economic power in the world (after the US and Japan). The post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, were relatively poor and desperate for international investment and capital. Given its economic wealth and geographical proximity, Germany was well positioned to benefit from the new opportunities that were opening up in the countries to its east, including the possibility of new markets and lower production costs for German companies that chose to relocate there. In exploiting these opportunities, German exporters and investors would benefit from historical links between Germany and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), as well as eastern Germany’s former ties with fellow members of the Soviet bloc. In view of its economic power and numerous competitive advantages, as well as the general receptivity of the post-communist states to German investment and deeper economic ties, many expected Germany to quickly re-establish its economic dominance in the region. In fact, Germany quickly established itself after 1989 as Central and Eastern Europe’s primary trade partner and source of foreign investment.

Germany’s size and economic power would inevitably give it political influence. However, this would have to be exercised carefully. The legacy of the past and political and cultural sensitivities on both sides would not allow Germany to exert direct political influence over its eastern neighbours. Indirect influence and leadership, however, could be exercised through German prominence in European institutions, especially the EU. As the largest member state and national economy, as well as the largest net contributor to the EU budget, Germany would have considerable influence over EU policies towards the post-communist countries. These included economic assistance and financial aid (although bilateral assistance provided a more direct source of influence). Germany would also exert a strong influence over EU enlargement policy. This required major changes to national institutions, laws, and administrative systems as a precondition for EU membership, which was a top priority for all the former communist states. Thus, because of its influential position within the EU, Germany would have considerable leverage over the CEECs during the lengthy pre-accession process, consisting of EU-supervised preparations for membership and formal negotiation of the terms of accession. Once these countries were in the EU, close economic and political ties and common geographical interests would lead to the emergence of a Central European bloc of member states, with Germany as the natural leader.

Underpinning Germany’s political dominance in Central Europe would be the third pillar of hegemony, culture. German cultural power stemmed not just from the growing
use of the German language in Central Europe and the influence of its national media. It also stemmed from the model character of Germany’s social and political institutions. The German ‘social market economy’, especially its capacity to combine economic growth with social cohesion and stability, was widely admired in the post-communist states and regarded as an appropriate model for emulation. German democratic institutions were also admired and closely studied. The model character and attractiveness of German society and institutions would be an important source of indirect soft power for Germany in Central Europe, allowing it to exert influence and shape developments in the region. German influence and power would be enhanced by the convergence of national social and political institutions on the German model, as well as the normative leadership conferred by Germany’s model status.

In summation, German hegemony in Central Europe would be multi-dimensional and relatively indirect. The source of Germany’s power would be its ability to influence and shape developments in the region through economic integration, political leadership in supranational institutions, and the exemplary character of its domestic social and political model. This would be a benign hegemony with positive effects, and one that would therefore be willingly accepted by its Central European neighbours.

This, in short, was the expectation. What, in fact, has been the reality? How do the prospects for German hegemony in Central Europe appear today, 15 years after unification and the end of the cold war? In seeking to answer this question, a key problem is how to measure or assess German hegemony. One usable definition of Germany’s hegemony in Central Europe is its capacity to ‘effectively pre-define policy outcomes in the region’. To what extent, then, has Germany been able to use its various sources of power to effectively determine economic and political outcomes in relations with its Central European neighbours? With this question in mind the following sections examine, in turn, each of the three pillars of prospective German hegemony, in the light of developments over the past 15 years.

ECONOMIC HEGEMONY

As expected, Germany has established itself as a major economic presence in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. Germany is the main economic and trade partner of each of the Visegrad countries. Whether Germany’s economic position in this region qualifies as hegemonic is questionable, however. Also uncertain is the extent to which German economic influence can be translated into political influence in these countries.

Economic and financial aid is one source of political influence, and after 1989 Germany was the largest source of bilateral assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries. However, the importance of bilateral aid decreased as these countries made economic progress and moved closer to the goal of EU membership, especially the more economically advanced Visegrad states. By contrast, export markets and foreign direct investment have both gained in importance. Economic assistance has also been increasingly channelled through multilateral institutions, especially the EU in the form of pre-accession aid. After membership, it has taken the form of subsidies for agriculture and regional development through normal EU programmes. As the largest net contributor to the EU budget, Germany is a major provider of such
multilateral funds as well, and it has a major voice in EU decision making on the use of this money. However, the extent of its control is necessarily less than in the case of bilateral aid.

Germany is the main trade partner of the Visegrad countries. For Poland, in 2004 Germany was the destination for 33.1 per cent of all exports, a share almost five times greater than that of the next largest markets, both Italy and France at 7 per cent. Germany also accounted for the largest share of imports, 22.3 per cent, compared to 9 and 8.3 per cent for Italy and France respectively.11 However, Germany’s trade position has declined somewhat since the mid-1990s, when it absorbed 38.3 per cent of Polish exports and accounted for 26.6 per cent of imports.12

Germany occupies a similar trade position vis-à-vis Hungary. In 2004 it absorbed 31.4 per cent of all Hungarian exports, more than quadruple the share of the next largest market – Austria – at 6.8 per cent. Germany was also the largest source of imports, accounting for 29.2 per cent, compared to Austria (8.3 per cent), Russia (5.7 per cent), and Italy (5.4 per cent).13 In contrast to the situation with Poland, Germany’s role as a trade partner for Hungary has continued to grow, its share of Hungarian exports increasing from 23.4 per cent in 1995, while its import share increased from 28.6 in that year.14

Germany is also far and away the main trade partner of the Czech Republic. In 2004, it was the market for 36.2 per cent of Czech exports, compared to only 8.5 per cent for Slovakia, the next largest market. Germany also accounted for 31.7 per cent of all imports, compared to 5.4 per cent for Slovakia.15 Germany’s trade position vis-à-vis the Czech Republic has remained fairly steady since the mid-1990s. In 1995, it absorbed 37.6 per cent of all Czech exports and was the source of 31.7 per cent of imports.16

For Slovakia, Germany was the destination for 28.7 per cent of all exports in 2004, a far greater share than the next largest export markets, the Czech Republic (13.3 per cent) and Austria (7.8 per cent). Germany was also the largest source of imports, accounting for 23.8 per cent in 2004, compared to 13.2 per cent for the Czech Republic, 9.4 per cent for Russia, and 5.6 per cent for Italy.17 Germany has become a more important trade partner of Slovakia since the mid-1990s, its share of Slovak exports growing from 18.8 per cent in 1995, and its share of imports from 14.3.18

Germany is also a major source of foreign investment for the Visegrad countries, although not in all cases the largest. In December 2003, Germany was only the fourth largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Poland, accounting for about 12 per cent of the cumulative total. The largest source was France, with 19 per cent, followed by the Netherlands, 14 per cent, and the US, also around 12 per cent. Germany had the largest number of companies (226) investing in Poland, however, followed by the US (123), the Netherlands (110), and France (91).19

The situation is somewhat different in Hungary, where Germany is the largest source of foreign direct investment, accounting for 29 per cent of cumulative FDI at the end of 2003, followed by the Netherlands (20 per cent) and Austria (11 per cent).20

Germany is the second largest source of foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic. In first place is the Netherlands, which accounted for 31 per cent of cumulative FDI in December 2003, while Germany was the source of 21 per cent followed by Austria (12 per cent), France (8 per cent), and the US (5.2 per cent).21
In Slovakia, Germany is the largest source of FDI, accounting for 22.7 per cent of the cumulative total in September 2004. Next are the Netherlands (16.5 per cent) and Austria (14.3 per cent). What these figures make clear is that Germany is a dominant economic presence in Central Europe. It is not clear, however, that Germany’s economic position and role can be classified as hegemonic. In the trade realm, Germany is the main export market for the Visegrad countries, generally absorbing more than a third of all exports. Its share of exports has stabilized or declined slightly for Poland and the Czech Republic since the mid-1990s, however, while increasing for Hungary and Slovakia. For the first two countries, this may indicate a growing diversification of export markets, the result of greater integration into the EU and global markets, although it could also be a reflection of slower economic growth in Germany since the late 1990s. This is a trend that should continue for all of the Visegrad countries now that they are EU members. A growing diversification of trade and export markets would lessen the dependence of these countries on Germany, and reduce the possibilities for German economic hegemony in Central Europe.

The case for German economic hegemony is even less clear when it comes to foreign direct investment. Other countries have also established a significant presence in Central and Eastern Europe in this regard. At the end of 1999, for instance, the Netherlands was the top source of foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe overall (22 per cent), followed by Germany (20 per cent), the US (9 per cent), and Austria and France (both 7 per cent). While the US share may be expected to decline in the future, a consequence of both geography and EU membership, it is likely that the Central and Eastern European countries will continue to seek diversified sources of FDI.

The extent to which economic presence and influence translates into political influence is also questionable. Economic decisions, whether to trade or invest, are generally private sector decisions, made by companies on the basis of commercial considerations. It is not clear how much influence over these decisions governments have. This is especially the case in Europe’s integrated single market, where government efforts to influence the economic behaviour of companies and investors are generally prohibited as discriminatory under EU law. The German government, for example, cannot actively discourage the import of Polish goods or the outflow of private investment to Poland without falling foul of EU authorities. It is not clear, therefore, just how much political influence vis-à-vis its EU neighbours Germany enjoys by virtue of its role as a major export market or source of foreign direct investment. Perhaps greater influence stems from its role as primary net contributor to the EU budget, which affects such issues as the amount and distribution of EU subsidies. This is an indirect outcome of economic size and power, however, and is better considered under the section on political hegemony.

Monetary relations are another area where Germany could potentially exert influence over the Central and Eastern European countries. Each of these countries has made it a goal to join the Euro-zone as quickly as possible after accession. To do so, they will have to meet strict budgetary and economic criteria, and be approved for membership by the current Euro-zone members. Germany’s role in this process could be crucial, given its economic size and importance. Nevertheless, Germany’s formal voting weight in EMU governing bodies is no greater than that of other large
member states. EMU thus provides another example of how Germany’s power is moderated rather than magnified through EU structures.

POLITICAL HEGEMONY

Since 1989 Germany has established good relations with each of the Central and Eastern European countries, overcoming lengthy historical legacies of conflict and distrust. Perhaps the one major exception to these generally good relations has been the flare-up with the Czech Republic over the post-war Benes decrees in spring and summer 2002. However, this episode was more the product of a convergence of electoral cycles in the two countries than an indication of serious structural problems in the relationship. Overall, Germany’s policy towards the Visegrad countries has focused on the dual goals of ‘normalization’ and ‘multilateralization’ of relations within the context of the EU and other European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.25

The initial focus of Germany–CEEC relations was the conclusion of bilateral friendship treaties and economic and trade agreements.26 The growing web of agreements between the CEECs and the EU quickly subsumed bilateral links, however. Beginning in 1992, each of the CEECs signed ‘Europe Agreements’ with the EU, establishing the legal basis of economic and political relations in the period before accession. ‘Accession Partnerships’, detailing the legal and administrative changes that needed to be made as a condition of membership, were signed between the EU and each of the Central and Eastern European candidate countries in 1998. Actual negotiations on the terms of membership began in 1998, and the EU member states and most of the candidate countries signed the formal ‘Accession Treaty’ in April 2003. Under the terms of this treaty, following ratification in each of the accession countries and member states, ten candidate countries, including the Visegrad four, officially joined the EU in May 2004.27

Germany has been a major proponent of EU enlargement. Indeed, this has been a key aspect of Germany’s foreign policy and a cornerstone of its relations with the post-communist countries. In the early and middle 1990s, the German government repeatedly labelled itself the primary ‘advocate’ (Anwalt) for its eastern neighbours as they sought to gain membership in the EU and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. This distinguished it from other EU member states, including France, the Benelux countries, and Spain, which were much more reluctant to enlarge and fearful of the consequences of EU expansion for their own interests. German national interests, however, favoured enlargement. Economically, Germany stood to gain the most from inclusion of the CEECs in the EU single market. Enlargement would enhance Germany’s security by consolidating a belt of friendly democracies to its east and shifting Germany from the insecure periphery of the EU to its safe middle. In political terms, Germany’s influence within the EU would likely be enhanced by the accession of its Central European neighbours, giving it a group of potential new allies that would lessen political dependence on France and create new coalition possibilities in intra-EU bargaining. A strong sense of moral obligation and responsibility, based on the past, also drove German enlargement policy.28

Admittedly, German actions did not always match the rhetoric or declared policy intentions. With regard to NATO, for instance, the German government was initially
reluctant to back US plans for expansion, fearing that this would unnecessarily antagonize Russia and undermine democratic reformers in that country. In the case of EU enlargement, Germany’s enthusiasm for rapid expansion initially extended only to its immediate eastern neighbours (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic). Worries about the potential financial cost and concerns about Russian interests in the Baltic states prevented the German government from supporting a broader enlargement, which was advocated by some other EU member states. Despite these inconsistencies, however, the image of Germany as a key promoter of the eastward extension of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions is largely warranted. Germany’s role in this regard is particularly important within the EU, given its greater relative importance and influence in this organization. Because of American dominance and leadership in NATO, Germany’s role in the expansion of that organization has not been as crucial.

Germany’s key role in the EU and its enlargement process should have been a major source of leverage and influence vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European countries during the pre-accession process. Certainly, Germany’s support for enlargement helped ensure generally good relations with the CEECs during this period. However, specific instances in which this leverage or influence was used for the purpose of enhancing German national interests are difficult to find. In the pre-accession preparations for membership, although Germany was a major supplier of technical advice and assistance to the applicant countries (through arrangements such as ‘twinning’), the pre-accession process in the CEECs was organized and led by the Commission, a supranational institution in which all EU member states are represented. Germany was also the main supplier of pre-accession financial assistance to the CEECs via its role as the EU’s main budgetary contributor, but here again direct influence over how that money was used could not be exercised because the funds were distributed through the Commission and supranational mechanisms.

Perhaps the main examples of Germany bringing its influence to bear are in the accession negotiations on several key issues or chapters of the acquis communautaire. In each instance, the German government responded to domestic political pressures or sought to guarantee that key national interests were protected. One such issue was the chapter on ‘free movement of labour’, where the German government, along with Austria, insisted upon and gained a lengthy transition period before workers from the new member states would be allowed to travel freely into Germany in search of jobs. This demand was in response to domestic labour market concerns, especially the fear that already depressed border areas could be swamped with day labourers commuting across the Polish and Czech lines. In return, however, Germany was compelled to agree to demands for a similar transition period before EU nationals would be permitted to buy relatively cheap farmland and real estate in Poland, Hungary, and other new member states.

The German government also took a hard-line position on the financial aspects of enlargement, insisting on strict budgetary limits to expensive programmes such as the Structural and Cohesion Funds (economic development assistance for relatively poor regions and countries) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In the end some compromises were made. After beginning the accession negotiations by insisting that no CAP direct subsidies be given to CEEC farmers in the initial years after accession, the German government relented somewhat. It accepted the Commission’s proposal to allow a percentage of normal CAP subsidies (25 per cent) to be given to farmers
in new member states, with step-wise increases each year until the full level of subsidies was eventually reached. At the Copenhagen summit of December 2002, which brought the negotiations to an end with final agreement on an accession treaty, the German government came under considerable pressure from the governments of Poland and other candidate countries to sweeten the financial pot, but it basically held the line.

The German government also took a tough position in the accession negotiations on the terms of membership of the candidate countries in two special intra-EU arrangements, the Schengen agreement on the removal of internal border controls and EMU. In the former case, Germany demanded and gained a lengthy transition period before it would allow the removal of passport and customs controls along its lengthy borders with Poland and the Czech Republic. Along with other member states, it insisted that the new members provide sufficient evidence of increased security along their external borders with non-member countries (i.e. Poland with Ukraine) before full integration in the Schengen area would be permitted. In similar fashion, Germany and other member states demanded a sufficient transition period and more evidence of economic convergence with EU standards (for inflation, budget deficits, interest rates, etc.) before the new member states would be permitted to join EMU. On both of these issues, Berlin’s position was backed by other member states, although Germany’s geographical situation (shared borders with new member states) and essential interest in a strong and credible EMU gave it particular reasons to adopt a tough stance.

The fact that Germany used its weight and influence to bargain hard to protect its national interests in the accession negotiations provides no evidence of German dominance or hegemony over its eastern neighbours, however. This is normal state behaviour in intergovernmental or international relations, and similar bargaining strategies were pursued by other member states. The best case for such an argument may be the financial aspects of enlargement, where Germany’s position as the EU’s largest economic power and budgetary contributor gave it a preponderant voice in setting the financial terms of enlargement. Even here, however, Germany was forced to compromise with other member states (for instance France, over the CAP), the Commission (which favoured granting some direct CAP subsidies to the new member states), and the candidate states (which sought the best financial deal possible given their limited bargaining power).

Germany’s position of strength vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European countries during the pre-accession period also did not buy it special deference or obedience from these countries on other issues. This was obvious in the diplomatic crisis over the Iraq war in early 2003. The governments of the Visegrad countries and other CEECs lined up behind the US position and in opposition to Franco-German efforts to secure a common European position that advocated further inspections and continued efforts at a peaceful solution. That they did so is explained by a number of factors, including the pro-US sympathies of these countries, support for the US-led transatlantic alliance by new NATO members, and strong-arm tactics by the US government against candidate members of NATO (threatening to block their membership). It is also explained, however, by the desire of the future EU members to demonstrate their foreign policy independence vis-à-vis the Franco-German axis. In the end, most of
these countries attempted to find a middle position somewhere between Washington and Paris/Berlin, but they also made it plain that they regretted and resented being put in a position of having to choose between the two poles of leadership. This is a position that the German government has some historical experience of, and should certainly sympathize with as well.\textsuperscript{31} On a related issue, in 2003 the Central and Eastern European countries also rejected a German and French-led effort to create new common defence policy structures for the EU that might undermine NATO.\textsuperscript{32}

A willingness to challenge German views and preferences is also evident in the intergovernmental negotiations that preceded agreement in July 2004 on the new EU constitutional treaty. In these negotiations, the Visegrad four and other candidate countries uniformly opposed the efforts of Germany and other larger member states (France, the UK, Spain, and Italy) to shrink the Commission and create a powerful new full-time President of the European Council. Instead, consistent with their interests as small countries (all but Poland) and new members, they demanded the equal representation of all member states on the Commission. They also advocated a strong Commission and Community method of decision making as an antidote to the dominance of larger countries within the European Council.\textsuperscript{33} In the end, the new member states, along with other smaller member states, were forced to accept some of the institutional reforms favoured by the larger countries, but not without a struggle and not without gaining concessions in return.

Why has Germany’s advantageous position vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European countries not translated into specific policy gains and deference towards Germany over the past decade? One reason is the need for the CEEC states to demonstrate to their own citizens as well as other countries their independence and willingness to defend their national interests. This is a matter of pride and credibility for recently independent states, especially ones that have suffered so much from German domination in the past. Intertwined with the resistance and assertiveness of the CEECs is Germany’s own reluctance to directly assert power, the product of engrained habits of restraint as well as special moral constraints operating in relations with its Central and Eastern European neighbours.\textsuperscript{34} Germany’s overriding interest in enlargement and the broader benefits to be gained from it also argued against national assertiveness on particular issues that might lead to conflicts that delayed enlargement or left bitter tastes in the mouths of new member states. Such actions would also have contradicted German rhetorical commitments to enlargement and European unity, which in a sense had become binding. Finally, it is obvious that the EU’s supranational institutions greatly moderate or deflect the expression of German power and influence. German power in the EU cannot always be expressed directly, for decisions are made jointly with other member states and are shaped by the influence of the Commission, European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and other supranational institutions. Thus, German gains in the EU are the result of bargaining and compromise, and usually reflect the interests of other member states and EU institutions as well as those of Germany.

The inability (and unwillingness?) of Germany to utilize its advantageous position in the pre-accession period to exercise direct power and influence over its Central and Eastern European neighbours leads one to question its ability to dominate these countries now that they are members of the EU. Now inside the EU, the governments
of the new member states have even less incentive to defer to German interests, since neither Germany nor any other member state can any longer block or deny them what they most coveted, which was EU membership. Some leverage may remain from the decisions to be made about membership in EMU and the Schengen area, but the extension of membership in these arrangements is also probably in the long-term interest of Germany and other old member states as well.

As member states, the Visegrad countries now have a formal vote in EU decisions (including a national veto on some issues), and they will be in a position to bargain and build ‘winning’ or ‘blocking’ coalitions with other member states on specific policy issues. Such coalitions may or may not include Germany, but are likely to be flexible and shifting, with composition depending on the particular issue at hand. In the situation of flexible and shifting coalitions that is likely to define EU intergovernmental politics after enlargement, the emergence of a stable, cross-issue, German-led Central European bloc is highly improbable. On most issues, the new member states will have plenty of other bargaining coalitions and options available. It is also likely that there will be numerous policy differences with Germany, such as the post-accession disagreements over corporate tax levels and the proposed EU services directive. In particular, Germany’s role as the EU’s largest budgetary contributor, and the probable demands of the relatively poor new member states for more EU subsidies and financial support, would seem to pre-ordain conflict on budgetary and financial issues. Because of different policy preferences in a number of areas, and without the goal of accession as a disciplining factor, relations between Germany and the Visegrad countries should continue to ‘loosen’ after enlargement.

CULTURAL HEGEMONY

The idea of German cultural hegemony (the attractiveness of ideas and values) is largely predicated on the model character of successful German institutions. In particular, the German social market economy, which combined economic growth and efficiency with social cohesion, and German democratic institutions, which combined governmental effectiveness and stability with the protection of individual rights, were both viewed as attractive models which the transitioning post-communist states might seek to emulate. Emulation and the adoption of German institutional norms, it was felt, would give Germany considerable influence over the construction of new states and societies, thus enhancing its hegemonic presence in the region. As this section will argue, however, the extension of German cultural hegemony has been undermined by internal problems that have diminished the appeal of the German model and undermined German ‘soft power’, and by the inappropriateness of German institutional models for the specific conditions of the post-communist states.

While German democratic institutions provided an attractive and instructive model for the Visegrad countries as they remade their own governmental and political systems, there has been only a limited amount of direct institutional copying or borrowing that has actually occurred. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have all adopted governmental systems featuring a relatively weak, ceremonial president (head of state) and a strong prime minister (head of government), although lack of clarity over the powers and role of the president were the source of political problems in
Slovakia before 1998. These bear a strong similarity to Germany’s chancellor-centred parliamentary system. Poland, however, reflecting its own national traditions and needs, established a semi-presidential system that is more comparable (although only to a limited extent) to the French model.

The Visegrad states all diverge sharply from the German model when it comes to the design of their national parliaments. While Germany has a bicameral legislature with a fairly powerful upper house (the Bundesrat), the Visegrad countries have opted for either unicameral legislatures (Hungary, Slovakia) or bicameral parliaments with weak upper houses (Poland, the Czech Republic). The absence or relative weakness of upper houses reflects, in large part, the different territorial politics of Germany and the Visegrad states. While Germany is a decentralized federal system, the Visegrad countries remain fairly centralized unitary states, despite EU pressure for decentralization in the pre-accession period as a requirement of membership and the receipt of regional development assistance (Structural Funds).

A better case of institutional borrowing may be electoral systems. Both Hungary and Poland have adopted a German-style system of mixed proportional representation (PR) and single-member district voting, although each with some variations from the German system. In Hungary, unlike Germany, there is a second round of voting for constituency representatives if one candidate does not receive an absolute majority in the first round (similar to France). In Poland, much greater weight is given to PR voting, which elects three-quarters of the members of the lower house (Sejm), while in Germany one-half of the Bundestag seats are filled by elections in single-member districts. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, by contrast, use a PR electoral system. All four countries, however, have adopted a 5 per cent threshold in PR voting to eliminate small or extremist parties, identical to the German system.

Each of the Visegrad countries have also created Constitutional Courts (or Constitutional Tribunal, in the case of Poland), with the power to rule government acts unconstitutional. This closely parallels the model of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), although the trend towards establishing constitutional courts and judicial review has been a general European one after the Second World War.

There are also few similarities in political party systems. In each of the Visegrad countries parties have been established that resemble the German (and broader European) pattern of Social Democracy–Liberal–Christian Democracy. Party systems in the Visegrad countries are generally more fragmented and unstable than in established Western European democracies, however, and remain heavily influenced by the communist legacy and traumas of political and economic transition. Unique national factors and forces also play a major role in party politics, such as the position of the Catholic Church in Poland and Slovakia, Hungarian minority issues in Slovakia, and the rights of ethnic Hungarians living outside the country in Hungary. While political parties in the Visegrad countries may learn from those in the same party families in Germany and other more established democracies, they are ultimately oriented to and defined by national political conditions and demands.

Thus, when it comes to political and governmental institutions it is apparent that some institutional copying or emulation has taken place. This is only natural and to be expected given Germany’s proximity and record of political stability and success.
However, other successful models exist in Western Europe and North America for the post-communist countries to emulate. Unsurprisingly, institutional construction in the Visegrad countries has also been greatly influenced by different national conditions and traditions, and by domestic politics. The availability of a variety of models has therefore given the CEECs the ability to select from among those models (or aspects of them) that best suit their particular needs or conditions, or that offer the best fit with specific national traditions. The EU (especially the Commission), although it offers no explicit models or templates for how to organize political institutions on a national basis, has also exerted a significant influence on the building or reforming of government institutions in the applicant Central and Eastern European countries. Some German influence has been exercised through EU mechanisms in the provision of technical advice on administrative practices and procedures (through programmes such as ‘twinning’), but it is difficult to assess the importance of this influence relative to that of other member states which have also provided such advice.

Germany also presented itself as an attractive model to the post-communist states because of its successful social market economy. Here again, however, other models existed for possible emulation. For those on the left, the Scandinavian social democratic welfare states offered an even more advanced and attractive social-economic model. For economic liberals, the US and Thatcherite Britain were preferable templates. For many governmental and political elites in the post-communist countries, however, the German social market economy was a more practical compromise between these two extremes, with its ability to combine market efficiency and competitiveness with social cohesion.\footnote{Germany also presented itself as an attractive model to the post-communist states because of its successful social market economy. Here again, however, other models existed for possible emulation. For those on the left, the Scandinavian social democratic welfare states offered an even more advanced and attractive social-economic model. For economic liberals, the US and Thatcherite Britain were preferable templates. For many governmental and political elites in the post-communist countries, however, the German social market economy was a more practical compromise between these two extremes, with its ability to combine market efficiency and competitiveness with social cohesion.}

A problem with the German social market model, however, to say nothing of the more generous and protective Scandinavian alternative, is its cost, especially in conditions of increased global competition and the monetary and budgetary restrictions imposed by EMU. Quite simply, the relatively poor post-communist states cannot afford the German social market model at present, and may be constrained from pursuing it in the future, even as they become wealthier, by both EU restrictions and global competitive conditions. The German social market model is also under considerable pressure from global market forces and demographic trends, and is badly in need of restructuring and reform. It has thus lost a substantial amount of its lustre as a model for emulation.

Thus, as the Visegrad countries face crises of their own welfare and social systems, requiring politically painful budget cuts and reductions in pensions and other social benefits, the German social market model is receding as an achievable and practical goal. In redesigning social welfare systems for the future, the Visegrad states will no doubt draw on the current German experience with reform and restructuring, but also on the examples and experiences of other countries and models (including more liberal and ‘middle-way’ social democratic models). In order to avoid some of the problems currently bedevilling the German social-economic system, and because of the pressures of their own welfare state crises, the CEEC governments may be forced to adopt more creative and innovative approaches rather than simply copying older or existing models.

Whatever solutions to the welfare state crisis are eventually adopted in Europe will probably be greatly influenced by common EU rules and processes of mutual learning
across different countries. At the moment, social and welfare policy remains the preserve of national governments and a considerable amount of divergence in national approaches is notable. However, EU rules and restrictions and mutual learning could lead to increased convergence of national models in the future. In this process, Germany will be adapting and learning as much as other countries. It is even possible that the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe could provide some lessons for Germany on this score, rather than Germany being the model that they seek to emulate.

The current crisis of the social market economy has certainly diminished the appeal of that model to Germany’s neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. Something similar can be said of Germany’s political institutions, because of the failure or inability of successive German governments to achieve necessary reforms. From an image of efficiency and stability, Germany’s political system has been transformed in the minds of many of its Central and Eastern European neighbours into one of gridlock and paralysis. This situation may confirm the wisdom of not adopting in wholesale fashion German political and social institutions. In particular, German-style federalism appears to be a barrier to reform. The faded appeal of the German political model is thus another factor undermining the potential for German influence and hegemony in the region.

There is yet another aspect of the German political-cultural model that may be presumed to have held some appeal for the post-communist states, and this is German ‘post-nationalism’. Since the 1950s, Germany has played the role of ‘model student’ in the EU and European integration process, subsuming its identity and interests under European and multilateral institutions. A key goal of German post-nationalism was to make national borders irrelevant in an increasingly integrated and peaceful Europe. German post-nationalism may have waned somewhat since the 1980s, as a ‘normalized’ and unified Germany has become more assertive of its national interests and preferences within the EU and other multilateral institutions. Nevertheless, German-style post-nationalism had some appeal for post-communist leaders and elites, who made ‘re-joining’ or ‘returning to Europe’ a major priority after the 1989 revolution. The ideology of post-nationalism has conflicted with revived national feelings and identities in these countries, however, as well as the need to assert national interests in the tough EU accession negotiations. The idea that borders should be irrelevant meets with conflicting responses on the part of many Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians. It is fine when it comes to the free movement of labour into the more prosperous Western European countries, but generates wariness and suspicion when freedom of German investors to purchase farmland and vacation houses in their countries is proposed. The appeal of post-nationalism may also suffer from the more competitive politics of intergovernmental bargaining and flexible and shifting coalitions in an enlarged EU.

CONCLUSION

The thesis of German hegemony in Central Europe is based upon three pillars of dominance: economic, political, and cultural. Each of these pillars has been examined more closely in the previous three sections. This examination reveals that only in the
economic arena can Germany be said to be dominant in relations with its eastern neighbours, and even in this area the extent of German dominance is limited.

Since 1989, Germany has established itself as the main economic partner of each of the Visegrad countries. Germany is the main trade partner of all four countries, absorbing roughly 25 per cent to more than one-third of all exports, and accounting for a somewhat lesser percentage of the imports of each country. Germany’s trade share has stabilized or declined slightly since the mid-1990s for each of these countries, however, with the exception of Slovakia. What this may indicate is a trend toward growing diversification of trade partners as integration into the EU single market progresses, a trend which may be expected to continue now that the Visegrad states are members of the EU. Germany is also among the major sources of FDI for each of the Visegrad countries, but it is the primary source only in Hungary and Slovakia. Despite the advantages conferred by Germany’s geographical proximity, more distant countries such as France and the Netherlands have been greater sources of FDI in Poland and the Czech Republic. In sum, Germany is a vital trade and economic partner of the Visegrad countries, but whether its economic position in these countries can be considered dominant is debatable.

In the political realm, Germany occupied a highly advantageous position vis-à-vis the Visegrad states in the decade-plus leading up to accession, owing to its importance and key role within European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially the EU, of which the Central and Eastern European countries badly wanted to be members. Nevertheless, this advantageous position was not translated into direct political influence or specific political gains for Germany in its relations with these countries. This may be explained by the mediating role of the EU (Germany was unable to exercise political influence in the enlargement process directly, but needed to do so indirectly through the EU, in which it is an influential country but certainly not hegemonic) and the leading role of the Commission in the enlargement process. In the case of NATO, the dominant role of the US in that organization limited the possibilities for German influence. It is also explained by internal ‘cultural’ constraints, namely, an ingrained reluctance to assert its power in relations with other countries that has been a distinguishing feature of Germany’s post-war foreign policy. The Visegrad countries also were unwilling to defer too easily to German interests and demands, needing to demonstrate their own independence for reasons of domestic politics, self-image, and external credibility. The supranational context of the EU (and NATO) allowed them to behave in this manner, even in the period before accession. Formal accession confers the security of membership and full voting rights to these countries, possibly presaging more open conflicts of interest with Germany in the future.

Regarding cultural hegemony, expected German dominance in the realm of values and ideas has been undermined by internal failures of the German social-economic and political models, making them less appealing to emulate and thereby diminishing Germany’s normative or ‘soft power.’ The non-appropriateness of many elements of these models for the CEECs has also limited their exportability. Moreover, other Western European countries and advanced democracies offer alternative models for the CEECs to choose from, as they attempt to build new social and political institutions in accordance with national traditions and conditions. The EU itself, through its vast web of rules (the *acquis communautaire*) and pre-conditions for membership, also
exerts a moulding influence on the new democracies and market economies of Central and Eastern Europe, and did so especially in the pre-accession period.

So the case for German hegemony in Central Europe does not appear to be a very strong one. Even if the point of German economic dominance could be conceded, which is arguable, the hegemony thesis would not be validated. This is because the concept of hegemony is a multi-dimensional one, a stool with three legs. According to this definition, Germany would have to be clearly dominant in at least two of these categories to be considered hegemonic overall. Most post-1989 speculations about German hegemony considered Germany’s overwhelming dominance in the economic and cultural realms to be a given, which would then enhance Germany’s hegemonic status and power within the political realm, exercised through the EU and other European institutions. Our examination has shown, however, that the predictions of cultural hegemony were mistaken or overly simplistic, and that expectations of German economic dominance were also exaggerated.

The least credible aspect of the German hegemony thesis, however, is the political dimension. Scholars such as Katzenstein posited that since Germany’s tremendous power was institutionalized or internationalized through the EU, it would be indirect and less visible, hence less objectionable to others. However, it is necessary to question just how much power Germany actually exerts in EU. While the EU’s supranational structures to some extent hide German power or diffuse it, they also dilute it by subjecting Germany to supranational decision-making processes in which other states have a voice and voting rights. In these processes, while Germany is clearly an important and influential player, it is not nearly so large or preponderant to be hegemonic or even dominant. Instead, to obtain its preferences Germany must cooperate and form alliances with other member states, which means bargaining, compromise, and tradeoffs. The size of ‘winning’ coalitions (the number of countries needed to gain a qualified majority in voting in the EU Council of Ministers) will only grow with enlargement, further reducing Germany’s power and influence. Germany’s diminished position within an enlarged EU will make it even less capable of exerting political hegemony in the more limited area of Central Europe, since relations between the countries of this region will be conditioned by the EU framework.

Germany is clearly not a traditional hegemonic power in Central Europe, in that ‘it can not effectively pre-define policy outcomes in the region’. However, its power and role as a ‘soft hegemon’ that seeks to shape the normative and institutional ‘milieu’ may also be greatly overestimated. This is due to the independence of Germany’s Central European neighbours and the availability of alternative partners and models. For now at least, it is also due to Germany’s economic and political weakness. Mostly, however, it is because of the EU’s supranational structures and processes, which lessen the dependence of the CEECs on Germany, and moderate and condition German power more than they add to it.

NOTES

1. The hegemony thesis described here is a composite, gleaned from a number of different sources. Much of the discussion of German hegemony took place in the popular media, while academic experts tended to be more sceptical. Among the scholarly publications which address the question of German


3. Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, ‘Should Europe Fear the Germans?’, in Huelshoff et al. (eds.), From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland, pp.271–89; and Markovits and Reich, The German Predicament.


9. Vladimir Handl, ‘Nemecky multilateralizmus a vztahy k státům visehradské skupiny’, (German Multilateralism and Relations among the Visegrad Group Countries), Mezinárodnı´ vztahy 38/1 (2003), pp.5–27.

10. In the period 1990–95, for instance, Germany contributed nearly 45 per cent of all EU bilateral assistance to the CEECs, and nearly one-quarter of the G24 total, which includes assistance from the EU and other OECD countries. Alan Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union’s Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.157.


20. Hungarian National Bank (MNB), ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Hungary, 1995–2003, (Budapest, 31 March 2005), p.42. The figure for The Netherlands is somewhat deceptive, however, since much of this investment originates in the US.
24. EU membership reduces the political risk of investing in the Central and Eastern European countries. It also means the end to special investment incentives given to American and other non-EU investors by Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries.
26. For details on these treaties and bilateral relations with each of the CEE countries, see the website of the German Foreign Ministry, under the heading of ‘Country and Travel Information’, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/index.html.
29. On Germany’s role in both EU and NATO enlargement, see Baun, ‘Germany and EU Enlargement’, and Baun, ‘Germany and the New Multilateral Institutional Order in Central and Eastern Europe’.
37. Markovits and Reich, ‘Should Europe Fear the Germans?’
41. On competing models and the restructuring of economies and welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe, see Laszlo Bruszt, ‘Making Markets and Eastern Enlargement: Diverging Convergence?’ in


43. Katzenstein, ‘United Germany’.
